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Power in Management and Organization Science

Peter Fleming[a] & André Spicer[b]

[a] Cass Business School, City University London

[b] Cass Business School, City University London
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PETER FLEMING

Cass Business School, City University London

ANDRÉ SPICER*

Cass Business School, City University London

Abstract

This paper reviews and evaluates the concept of power in management and organization science. In order to organize the extant literature on this topic, we develop a framework that identifies four faces of power (i.e. coercion, manipulation, domination, and subjectification) and four sites of power (i.e. power enacted "in", "through", "over", and "against" organizations). This allows us to evaluate assumptions both shared and contested in the field. Building on the review, the paper then points to potentially novel areas of research that may extend our understandings of organizational power in management and organization science.

*Corresponding author. Email: andre.spicer.1@city.ac.uk

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Introduction

> Organizations must be seen as tools ... A tool is something you can get something done with. It is a resource *if* you control it. It gives you power others do not have. Organizations are multipurpose tools for shaping the world as one wishes it to be shaped. They provide the means for imposing one's definition of the proper affairs of men [*sic*] upon other men. (Perrow, 1972, p. 14)

Never have organizations been under such political scrutiny as they are today. Large corporations routinely wade into political debates with attempts to shape public policy. Activists increasingly target specific organizations rather than governments. Concerned community groups lobby the state to curb the power of large enterprises. Public struggles for power over firms and community enterprises are often reported. Social movements have shifted from the status of fringe actors to central shapers of organization life, even contesting the very existence of enterprises that were once considered normal and indispensable to society (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005). And organizations themselves are rife with day-to-day political bustle, characterized by powerful actors either revered or despised, groups vying for influence and subordinates contesting decisions. Rather than being an aberration, it seems that power is an endemic part of organizational life. As Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips (2006, p. 3) poetically put it in relation to the key topic of this paper: "power is to organization as oxygen is to breathing".

But this observation also means that now more than ever we require rigorous and robust conceptualizations of how organizational power functions. Moreover, and as the opening quote by Perrow (1972) points out, a "political view" necessitates sound conceptualizations of the power that is used to shape, manage, and change large organizations today. The purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate the conceptualizations of power in management and organization studies in order to provide fresh avenues for future research.

The social sciences often conflate power and "politics" in and around organizations. Therefore, it is important to make an analytical distinction between the two concepts. For example, Weber (1978) defined power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his [*sic*] will despite resistance" (p. 53). As such, many have gone on to define politics as the tactics and strategies actors use to articulate this power or attempt to resist it, especially when goals and interests in the organization are conflicted. This is why organizational politics is still often understood to be nasty "backstabbing" types of behavior, involving backroom deals, and the irrational influence over others.

The above differentiation is not without its difficulties, of course. For example, Weber's definition of power tends to understand it as something individuals hold. This has inspired some classic approaches to the topic, in particular French and Raven's (1959) bases of power perceptive (which includes

coercive, reward, legitimate, referent, and expert modalities of power). Other research has correctly highlighted the *relational* nature of power, shifting the focus to structural relations rather than actor attributes. For example, Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings (1971) found that individual departments are not powerful in themselves but become so only when they create relational dependencies. The establishment and maintenance of such dependencies are the basis of inter/intra-organizational power and politics (also see Pfeffer & Salanick, 1974). In addition, Foucauldian approaches too have suggested that power resides *between* individuals, actors, and organizations rather than being seated within any given member (Clegg, 1990; Sewell, 1998).

For the purposes of this paper, we will broadly mark out the conceptual terrain by following Arendt's (1958, 1970) observation that politics consists of activity that rearranges relations between people and the distribution of goods (broadly defined) through the mobilization of power. In turn, power is the capacity to influence other actors with these political interests in mind. It is a resource to get things done through other people, to achieve certain goals that may be shared or contested. This understanding of organizational power will be the central concern of this paper.

If researchers sometimes conflate power and politics, there is also a converse trend in management science of omitting the political dimension from the concept of power. Consequently, power is deemed a functional resource and politics a messy irrationality in organizational life. In classical organization theory, for example, ordered social action was seen as the opposite of political activity (Perrow, 1972). Organizations were understood to be rational systems geared toward the achievement of specific ends. Politics, on the other hand, was thought to involve debate and deliberation around what those ends might be. To move an issue from a political one to an organizational one was seen as a process of "de-politicization" (Wolin, 2006). When politics did raise its ugly head in organizational life it was often considered a nuisance to everyday business—something to be kept to a bare minimum and contained.

This classic dichotomy between rational organizations and politics was called into question by a strand of literature which began to observe that organizations not only de-politicized social life. Rather, political dynamics are definitive of most power relations in organizations (Crozier, 1964; Cyert & March, 1961). Although organizational politics may be central to organizations as such, it is important to note that organizational politics is different insofar as its involves the exercise of power in the context of organizational domains rather than civil society or the state (Perrow, 1972). While the state and civil society might interface with organizations in a number of ways (Böhm, Spicer, & Fleming, 2008), the focus of our paper will be on organizational power rather than the political machinations that occur within the state or civil society.

A final point of clarification: power generally has negative connotations when it comes to understanding organizational life. It usually signifies coercion, the maintenance of hierarchies and subordinated positions. But as Clegg et al. (2006) correctly note, this is a one-sided "negative" view of the concept because it is deemed a force that largely quells dissent and alternative voices. It may certainly function in this manner, as much of the literature we review attests. But the phenomena may also prove to be very positive in some situations. As Clegg et al. (2006) point out:

> we do not think that organizational life and politics are necessarily nasty and backstabbing. They often are, but power need not always be regarded as something to be avoided. Power can be a very positive force; it can achieve great things. (p. 3)

In order to clarify the vast variety of negative and positive approaches, assumptions and theories regarding how power unfolds in and around organizations, we will posit our own taxonomy that we hope will aid future research. Building on Lukes (2005) and Fleming and Spicer (2007) we identify four "faces" of power: coercion, manipulation, domination, and subjectification. Each face may play out on four "sites": power "in", "through", "over", and "against" the organization. The paper argues that these expressions of power may be "episodic" (such as coercion and manipulation) as well as "systemic" (such as domination and subjectification). Having explained these concepts in more detail, we then present a systematic review of the literature that as analyzed organizational power to date. In the final part of the paper, we reflect on possible areas of future research in management and organization science.

Four Faces of Organizational Power

There have been many attempts to map the different forms which power takes in organizations (Anderson & Brion, 2014; Brass, 2002; Clegg et al., 2006; Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Mizruchi & Yoo, 2002; Ocasio, 2002; Pfeffer, 1981). One of the more enduring distinctions in the literature is between episodic theories of power (the direct exercise of power) and systemic forms of influence (power that is congealed into more enduring institutional structures) (Clegg, 1989; Lawrence, Malhotra, & Morris, 2012). These two broad dimensions can be further divided into four dimensions or "faces" (Fleming & Spicer, 2007): coercion, manipulation, domination, and subjectification (Table 1).

The first two faces of power—coercion and manipulation—can be considered episodic modes of influence because they rely upon identifiable acts that shape the behavior of others. Domination and subjectification are faces of power that can be considered systemic because they mobilize institutional, ideological, and discursive resources to influence organizational activity. As such they are often less visible than overt and explicit acts of power.

Table 1 Faces of Power

Focus	Faces of power	Description	Theoretical roots	Core mechanisms	Representative studies
Episodic	Coercion	Direct mobilization of power	Dahl (1957)	Formal position Personality Ability to reduce uncertainty	Weber (1947) House (1968) Crozier (1964)
				Possession of valuable resources	Pfeffer and Salanick (1974)
	Manipulation	Attempts to ensure action and discussion occurs within accepted boundaries	Bachrach and Baratz (1963)	Manipulation of rules Shaping anticipated results	Salznick (1949) Gouldner (1970)
				Network positioning Mobilization of bias	Burt (1995) Alexander (1979)
Systemic	Domination	Attempts to make relations of power appear inevitable and natural	Lukes (1974)	Articulating ideology Manufacturing consent Conformity with institutions	Alvesson (1987) Burawoy (1979) Fligstein (1987)
	Subjectification	Attempts to shape sense of self, experiences, and emotions	Foucault (1977)	Disciplinary regimes Construction of identities Articulation of discourse Governmentality	Townley (1993) Du Gay (1996) Maguire, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) Holmqvist and Maravalias (2011)

Coercion

Theories of organizational power as *coercion* focus on the direct exercise of power by individuals to achieve certain political ends. Fleming and Spicer (2007, p. 14) observe that this "type of power involves someone getting another person to something that he or she would have not otherwise done. They are simply told what to do 'or else'".

The research in this tradition builds on Dahl's (1957) conceptualization of power. These studies ask a simple question: what provides individuals with the ability to make another person (in an organizational context) to do something they would not otherwise do? Foundational studies here identify a range of bases of power that individuals draw upon in their political maneuvering (French & Raven, 1959). Psychological-based investigations propose that certain personality types play an important role in shaping the propensity and ability of individuals to engage in organizational politics (House, 1968). Bureaucratic theories of power highlight that the scope an individual has to exercise political power is shaped by the official office they hold (Merton, 1957).

Research in the later part of the twentieth century has observed how individuals tend to go beyond the legitimate authority vested in their position. Two findings are important here. First, an individual's power within an organization depends on their ability to reduce uncertainty (Crozier, 1964) and, second, the possession of resources considered valuable within the organization might determine an actor's ability to coerce others to act in a particular way (Mechanic, 1962; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1974; Thompson, 1956).

Manipulation

Power in and around organizations might also take the form of *manipulation*, whereby actors seek to either limit the issues that are discussed or fit issues within (what are perceived to be) acceptable boundaries. This type of power is concerned with agenda setting, as Fleming and Spicer (2007, p. 17) argue: "there is no direct exercise of coercion here. Instead, there is an implicit shaping of issues considered important or relevant".

Studies in this tradition have looked at how agendas are set in a range of ways. The construction and manipulation of rules is an important process. Salznick (1949), for example, demonstrated how issues are prevented from arising through reference to apparently objective and value-free criteria. Similarly, studies of gender in organizations observe how rules can equate masculine norms as organizational norms more generally, becoming an important political barrier for women moving up the ranks (Kanter, 1977). Further research in this tradition has explored how political dynamics not only shape these rules, but also manipulate practices so they appear to fit within predefined parameters (Clegg, 1975).

Another way agendas are set in organizational life is by shaping the anticipated outcomes of various behaviors. This could involve the manipulation of individual perceptions regarding future expressions of power or their own ability to cope and react to it. For example, factory workers are often fostered with a sense of powerlessness and thus have low expectations regarding the outcomes of any planned political action (Gouldner, 1970). In this respect, agendas can be set through the mobilization of bias. This occurs when some assumptions or ideas are systematically inserted into decision-making protocols and others are organized out. For instance, particular assumptions have been shown to shape decision-making processes in the military or the location of crucial transport infrastructures (Alexander, 1979). Finally, agendas can be established by using one's position within an organizational network to subtly influence decision-making processes. For example, an individual's position may act as a bridge between two different social groups, presenting them with significant opportunity to shape the distribution of information and resources in the enterprise (Burt, 1995).

Domination

A good deal of theories of organizational power views it as a process of *domination*, whereby actors establish influence through the construction of ideological values that become hegemonic (or dominant). In Fleming and Spicer's (2007) account of this face of power, they argue that there is little coercion or manipulation openly occurring. Instead, "this dimension of power shapes our very preferences, attitudes and political outlook" (Fleming & Spicer, 2007, p. 19). This idea builds upon Lukes' (2005) famous "radical view" of power, since it captures a type of politics that defines the very terrain in which political actors understand their organizational situation:

> Is not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept her role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable? (Lukes, 2005, p. 24)

This approach to power asks the following question: how are arbitrary hierarchical relations made to appear inevitable, natural and thus unquestioned? Here, the notion of ideology refers to the creation of shared assumptions and ideals that produce limited preferences and wants (Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980). Organizational ideology can be cultivated through a range of techniques, including corporate cultures (Kunda, 1992; Mumby, 1987), field-wide assumptions in particular industries (Simons & Ingram, 1997) or societal wide assumptions regarding the value of, say, technical rationality over other value systems (Alvesson, 1987).

Related to this area of inquiry is the analysis of how organizations function as institutional domains. An important facet of institutionalization pertains to the way they make certain assumptions legitimate, standard, and more prudent. There is now a substantial body of research on how institutions are created, maintained, and destroyed (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). The important theme for our purposes concerns how institutions operate as political forces to shore-up existing collective rules in a field. This leads to actors adopting practices not because they are necessarily more efficient, but because they are deemed expedient, providing a resource to garner broader legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). For example, large U.S. corporations increasingly recruited chief executive officers (CEOs) from a financial or legal background during the twentieth century as it made them appear to be reasonable in the eyes of the important financial actors and agencies (Fligstein, 1987).

Ideological norms often do not go unchallenged. For example, social movements have also received a good deal of attention in the way they can institutionalize new ideological values and perceptions regarding important political concerns within an organizational field. Previously dominant ideologies—pertaining to the environment or health issues, for example—may be usurped and replaced by an alternative set of values. As Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) state, this is an important corollary to theories of domination, since "it adds contestation, collective action, framing and self-conscious mobilization for alternatives to conceptual repertoires of legitimation, diffusion, isomorphism and self-reproducing taken-for-granted practices" (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008, p. 649).

Subjectification

The fourth face of organizational power is *subjectification*. This type of influence seeks to determine an actor's very sense of self, including their emotions and identity. Fleming and Spicer (2007) define this face of power in relation to manipulation and domination discussed above:

> Here, the focus is not on decision-making or non-decision making, or the ideological suppression of conflict, but the constitution of the very person who makes decisions. According to [Michel] Foucault, power is achieved through defining the conditions of possibility underlying how we experience ourselves as people. Power, therefore, produces the kind of people we feel we naturally are. (Fleming & Spicer, 2007, p. 23)

While this face of power does bear superficial similarities to ideological domination, it is in fact quite distinct. Domination shapes what is considered worthy of political attention and effort. Subjectification goes deeper, constituting what the person is: their lived sense of identity and selfhood. Domination may "naturalize" an extant social order whereas subjectification normalizes a

particular way of being in that social order. As such, the focus in management and organization science is on how actors become composed as "subjects of power" through a series of "micro-practices" which function on the level of everyday life (Foucault, 1977).

Studies have shown how subjectification can be mobilized through a wide range of systems in contemporary organizations. Teams and surveillance may promote moments of self-monitoring, resulting in the gaze of the supervisor being enacted by the employees themselves (Barker, 1993; Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992). Various forms of managerial knowledge or "discourses" can have this influence over organizational life too, including Human Resource Management (Townley, 1993), strategy (Knights & Morgan, 1991) and accountancy (Hoskin & Macve, 1986). As a result, the very identities of organizational members are enlisted to achieve certain political ends (also see Du Gay, 1996; Jacques, 1996).

Particularly important in this stream of research is the role of discourse. That is, systems of talk and texts that construct social reality in distinctive ways that guide our behavior (Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004). There is now a large body of literature mapping the political influence of organizational discourse, especially in relation to normalization, truth claims and insidious forms of organizational indoctrination (Phillips & Oswick, 2012). These discourses of power can achieve political ends by organizing the everyday conduct of actors, especially their processes of self-reflection and self-management (Holmqvist & Maravalias, 2011). Such political practices may occur within organizations, but also between and against the focal institution, as we shall soon see.

As Table 1 demonstrates, each face of power involves a difference set of tactics, resources, and strategies to influence the outcomes and behaviors of other individuals in and around the focal organization.

Four Sites of Organizational Power

We now will argue that the four faces of power occur in multiple locations in and around organizations. That is to say, coercion, manipulation, domination, and subjectification might be enacted from different perspectives *apropos* the focal organization. To demonstrate this, the paper will evoke a spatial metaphor to map four additional dimensions, namely: power *in* the organization, *through* the organization, *over* the organization, and *against* organization. In explicating each category, current research and new opportunities to extend it can be identified, as we shall demonstrate in the discussion section.

Power "In" Organizations

Power *in* organizations consists of struggles within its formal boundaries to influence, maintain, or change hierarchies and norms. A good deal of literature

on employer/employee conflict is relevant here. As are the studies that show how managerial command structures attempt to maintain internal regulation and negotiate shifting inter-organizational alliances.

Resistance to change may also function in this domain. Micro-political activities that force superiors to listen to subordinate claims, such as those mentioned by Courpasson and Clegg (2012), are relevant here. As might be whistleblowers that radically alter the internal political system of a firm by revealing illegal or unethical interests (Near & Miceli, 1995).

Power "Through" Organizations

Power *through* organizations occurs when an organization as a whole becomes a vehicle or agent to further certain political interests and goals. As an actor in its own right, organizations might wield its influence in certain markets, industries, and countries to establish favorable operating environments. Other actors might enlist corporations too. The literature on corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship, for example, has identified the way non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society institutions might form alliances with the firm to achieve respective goals (poverty relief, human and civil rights, etc.).

In other settings, firms might become the implicit vehicle for geopolitical objectives set by the state apparatus (securing oil supplies in the Middle East, for example). Corporate trade agreements are often arranged by governmental envoys because of the broader geopolitical benefits that might accrue. Likewise, media firms are often utilized by governments to shape various reputational outcomes.

Power "Over" Organizations

Power *over* the organization points to the way in which elites might compete to influence the objectives, strategies, and makeup of the organization. Management buyouts, private equity takeovers, shareholder activism and governmental attempts to regulate, nationalize, or breakup the enterprise are prime examples of this dimension of political activity.

Moreover, lobbying a firm to change the nature of its business model might be yet another example of this political dimension—animal rights groups boycotting an organization or publically revealing sensitive information might be a case in point. Shareholder activism is an important area of research here too.

Power "Against" Organizations

And power *against* the organization concerns attempts to use extra-organizational spaces to engage in political struggles in order to target organizational

activity. This entails various groups who step outside of the political dynamics of the organization to find support in their efforts to create change within an organization, industries, and sectors (Spicer & Böhm, 2007). This often occurs when organizational members participate in social movements to access wider networkers of supporters, resources, ideologies, and identities, which in turn allow them to influence the focal organization.

These extra-organizational spaces have proved to be very important in not only shaping organizational politics, but also creating political spaces that may yield alternative ways of organizing (e.g. non-market co-operatives, volunteer collectives, etc.). Research on social movements has especially made an important contribution to understanding this face of power, as we shall see in our review below.

These four sites of power interconnect with the faces we discussed earlier. In mapping these interconnections, we are able to gain a more comprehensive and systematic overview of the way organizations become political entities (Table 2). Moreover, this exercise provides us with a clearer idea about where future research efforts might be most fruitfully directed.

A Survey of the Literature

Coercion

Coercion is one of the most basic forms of political power in organizations. As we noted above, this entails actors seeking to use resources or bases of power which they have at their disposal to get someone to do something that they otherwise would not do (to paraphrase Dahl, 1957). This can be done (1) "in" organizations by a powerful individual using various resources to cajole other organizational members to do something, (2) "through" organizations when it becomes a collective actor mobilizing its own body of resources to change something in the external environment which otherwise would not change, (3) "over" organizations when actors use various resources to take control of that institution—through a takeover, or occupying the position of CEO, for example, and (4) "against" organizations when groups challenge and call into question the purpose of the institution.

The coercive deployment of power differs from the other faces of power which we will analyze since it is the most obvious and observable. Because this face is more noticeable, it has been the focus of much organizational research. We will now outline some of the major insights from this body of research.

Coercion "In" organizations. Much of the literature on coercion begins with Max Weber's account of authority in modern societies (Weber, 1947). Weber argued that authority is no longer allocated on the basis of traditional social relationships such as kinship or religious convention. Instead, it is largely allocated on the basis of occupying particular positions within formal

Table 2 Intersecting Faces and Sites of Organizational Politics

Faces of power	Politics in organizations	Politics over organizations	Politics through organizations	Politics against organizations
Coercion	Formal authority (Weber, 1947) Bases of power (French & Raven, 1959) Control of sources of uncertainty (Crozier, 1964) Control over valuable resources (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1974)	CEO control over scarce resources (Hambrick, 1981)	Control over resources need by stakeholders (Elg & Johansson, 1997) Organization use of resources to fend off unwanted environmental pressure (Lamburg & Pajunen, 2005)	Social movements mobilize valuable resources to pressure change in firms (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) Undermining existing resource flows (Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009)
Manipulation	Position in social networks (Hackman, 1985) Impression management (Maitlis, 2004) Use of storytelling (Humphreys & Brown, 2002)	Use of informal social ties (Allen & Panian, 1982) Informal social manipulation (Westphal, 1998) Sense-making and symbolism (Clark, 2004) Enrolling external agents (Maguire et al., 2004)	Selective information provision (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980) Use of elite networks (Siegel, 2007) Establishing operating principles in new fields (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009)	Manipulation of political climate (Böhm et al., 2008) Careful management of media image of firm (Carty, 2002) Creation of links with formal institutions (Palazzo & Richter, 2005)

Domination	Hegemony (Benschop & Doorewaard, 1998) Use of indeterminacy and autonomy (Sewell, 1998) Depoliticization (Contu & Willmott, 2003) Creating a sense of inevitability (Knights & McCabe, 1997) Incorporation (Guest & King, 2004)	Representation of external forces as immutable pressure (Morgan & Sturdy, 2000) Control by external resources (Pfeffer, 2003) Control by state agencies (Yoo & Less, 2009) Financialization (Davis, 2009) Shaping ideological climate (Vaara & Tienari, 2011)	Elites shaping interests of other actors (Barley, 2010) Shaping lawmaking and regulatory processes (Kerr & Robinson, 2012) Capturing civil society (Levy & Egan, 2003) Fostering strategic ambiguity (Davenport & Leitch, 2005)	Articulation of new ideologies to change industries (Van Bommel & Spicer, 2011) Social movements creating new organizational forms (Hensman, 2003)
Subjectification	Aligning self with the organization (Knights & McCabe, 1998) Articulation of discourses that shape identity (Townley, 1993) Disciplinary mechanisms (Thornborrow & Brown, 2009)	Propagation of new discourses (Spicer & Sewell, 2010) Development of new disciplinary technologies (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998) Shaping practices of sense-making (Clark & Geppert, 2011)	Constructing novel social identities (Hardy & Phillips, 1999) Development of new legal categories (Benjamin & Goclaw, 2005) Construction of new professional identities (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)	Rise of autonomous work settings (Adler, 2001) Resubjectification of organization (Sutherland, Bohm, & Land, in press) Tempered radicalism (Meyerson & Scully, 1995)

bureaucratic organizational structures. Authority is a property not of the person but of the office they occupy. So to occupy the position of CEO in a large corporation gives you significant scope and authority—but this is limited within particular jurisdictions.

If we strictly follow this reasoning, the authority of any actor within an organization can be implied from their job title. To be sure, Weber does recognize the acceptation of charismatic authority in such formal settings, whereby personal magnetisms and dynamism play a role. However, in bureaucratic settings this is relatively rare and highly unpredictable. The upshot is that formal bureaucratic authority is the central characteristics of modern organizations, and it is from whence the power of the manager flows.

Much of the literature on coercive power in post-war organization theory responds to this central Weberian thesis. It revealed that there was frequently a certain disconnect between the authority of the office and the power these individuals were able to wield. This is explained in French and Raven's (1959) theory about bases of power. In this theoretical investigation, they pointed out that individuals in organizations do not just derive their power from their positions of authority, but other sources too, including their expertise, being a reference point in a social group, the ability to punish and reward or being able to coerce and provide information (for an updated account see Raven, 1992).

This model has enhanced our understandings of how actors acquire power within organizations. For example, investigations of project managers demonstrate how they draw on a range of bases of power in order to advance their project (Gemmil & Wilemon, 1972). However, bases of power deemed most valuable tend to be mediated and defined by organizational structure. Another study on participation in the Netherlands found that attempts to create workplace equality were often thwarted by the unequal distribution of expertise (Mulder, 1971). Ultimately, the ability to enact power directly cannot be equated only with a position of authority. Other facets play an important role in this regard.

This insight was explored in another body of research concerning control over sources of uncertainty. Such uncertainty may be external to the organization—such as market demand—or internal to the enterprise such as a production process. An actor's ability to control these contingencies becomes central when organizational functionality is dependent on it. This in turn yields power. This is what Crozier's (1964) found in his classic ethnographic study of the distribution of power in a cigarette factory. He was surprised by how powerful the production maintenance personnel were. Upon closer inspection, he discovered that these staff controlled the central source of uncertainty within the firm. Because it was a national monopoly, the company could sell as many cigarettes as they produced. The only uncertainty was whether the

machines remained operational, a contingency that the machinists controlled. This gave them much coercive power within the factory.

Crozier's research was further developed in the influential Aston Studies. These investigations found that control over both external and internal sources of uncertainty within a firm tends to engender a particular sub-unit with more power than would be expected (Hinings, Hickson, & Pennings, 1974). Similar findings have been made in related research. For example, in a study of hospitals, life insurance companies and colleges, Hambrick (1981) observed that top executives who were able to control core sources of uncertainty through "environmental scanning" made them the most powerful members within the top management team.

A related observation was made by studies of resource dependency, which become popular during the mid-1970s, especially following the insights of Hickson et al. (1971). In a classic investigation, Pfeffer and Salanick (1974) asked what it was that gave particular departments within a large public university coercive power. They discovered that control over resources that were rare and central to the organization's functioning was the key source of such power—in this case, external research grants. They noted a rather perverse dynamic that developed as a result, whereby departments which already had resources were given more.

Many other studies have confirmed this core insight. For example, Pfeffer and Moore (1980) found that university faculties tended to gain more power if they exist in a relative coherent organizational field that gave them access to external funding. A related questionnaire-based study found that units which had captured resource flows within the organization had significantly more power to coerce other units, even those that were ostensibly more superior (Astley & Zajac, 1990). Indeed, the study of resource dependencies is a large and elaborate research area that has generated many insights (for a comprehensive review see Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). It has been so successful that many studies actually define and operationalize power as simply the control over scarce resources. However, there is a danger that in doing so, researchers ignore the wide range of possible sources of power that we cover in this review.

Coercion "Through" organizations.   This site of power suggests that organizations can be used to influence the broader organizational field in a number of ways. The organization becomes an actor in its own right. For example, the studies mentioned above have noted how the possession of resources is not just valuable to an organization, but also provide the focal organization with significant power within the external supply chain or sector. It has also been highlighted how institutions in a subordinate or dependent position can mean some actors are at the mercy of the demands made upon them by the focal organization in question. These can be very coercive relationships.

Studies of coercive power "through" the organization reveal how critical resources can aid the organization to either control other organizations within their sector, or conversely decrease the power which other institutions have over them. It also highlights how alternative paths of action might be used to decrease resource dependency, including social networks and subtle forms of manipulation from the field (Elg & Johansson, 1997).

The use of technology by an organization has been shown to have coercive power effects over other institutions within its domain (Morris, Tasliyan, & Wood, 2003). This in turn can change the power relationships within the firm itself as the demands of buyers and distributors change around the new technology. Other research has demonstrated how the coercive power that certain resources confer to an organization can be mediated by other factors. For example, relationships of long-term commitment can mitigate the way organizations enact power over other institutions within its field (Provan & Gassenheimer, 1994).

A further line of research has sought to understand how the possession of resources can help an organization fend off unwanted intrusions from the environment. For example, access to crucial power bestowing resources can help organizations survive during periods of crisis (Lamburg & Pajunen, 2005). Finally, a study of human service organizations in the U.S.A. found that firms with many linkages with the environment were able to control the coercive power wielded by larger organizations they depend upon for resources (Provan, Beyer, & Kruytbosch, 1980).

Coercion "Over" organizations.   Coercive power not only transpires in and through organizations. This kind of influence may also occur over them, in which actors and institutions attempt to exert authority over the direction of the organization. Here, coercion refers to the forcible imposition of certain interests and objectives over the focal institution in question. Coercion tends to be visible to the actors involved, and is typically obeyed because there is little other choice within the social relationship. While we usually view this kind of power as deriving from sources beyond the formal boundaries of the firm, agents within the focal organization may also enact it in order to redirect the institution as a whole. For example, this may occur when there is a strategic realignment of senior management, exerting new forms of governance over the firm.

This last point has attracted attention in management and organization science in relation to coercive political relationships. Indeed, perhaps the key body of research builds on the "upper-echelons" approach to power (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). These studies are based on the observation that the composition, structure, and processes of top management teams have a significant impact on the way the entire organization functions.

One important theme running throughout this "upper echelons" approach to power concerns the role of CEOs. What are the factors that give some CEOs more power over their organization than others? Typical answers include control over scarce and crucial resources (Hambrick, 1981). In other words, some CEOs achieve coercive power over the organization because they have access to scarce bodies of resource that others do not.

Subsequent research has gone on to explore the effects that powerful CEOs have on their organizations. For example, some studies have found that powerful CEOs tend to take more risks, leading to an "outlier performance"—either particularly high or particularly low (Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011). Moreover, they are also likely to initiate increased levels of strategic change (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007) and also benefit from higher levels of remuneration (Barkema & Pennings, 1998). This research highlights how the relative coercive power of CEOs in the top management team over the organization as a whole is dependent on the critical resources that they have access to. Such resources allow those taking control over the organization to make more risky decisions, but also defend themselves against demands which others actors such as buyers and suppliers might have.

Coercion "Against" the organization. Coercive power against the organization pertains to the way coercive force may be used to oppose and challenge the focal organization, to the point where its very existence may be threaten. In the management and organization studies literature, there is less research on this particular topic. However, social movement theory has examined how protest groups and collectives can mobilize resources in order to mount challenges to dominant organizations (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

This is an interesting area, since like other organizations, social movements depend upon scarce resources to maintain their campaign to coerce other institutions to change. This might come in the form of money, recruits, or knowledge to name just a few resource bases. The availability of these resources tends to shape whether a movement will thrive or decline. For example, the accessibility of many young, educated and enthusiastic recruits with free time during the 1960s allowed social movements to thrive during this period (Davis & Thompson, 1994). Furthermore, a social movement can then become a mechanism for mobilizing and directing these resources in pursuit of a particular change project. This point is very well illustrated in Davis and Thompson's (1994) study of the shareholder activist movement. They demonstrate how these activists mobilized a range of resources, including money and expertise in order to coercively challenge widespread understandings of corporate governance and push forward more pro-shareholder measures within this space.

Another study of an effective social movement focuses on the importance of coercively challenging the legitimacy of certain organizations and industries.

In an extensive longitudinal investigation of the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) between 1870 and 1920, Hiatt et al. (2009) reveal how the movement undermined the legitimacy of alcohol among consumers. Leveraging the virtues of sobriety and family values, the aggressive opposition to the longstanding practice of alcohol consumption was successful, leading to the vast closure of breweries. Importantly, the WCTU presented a viable alternative—soft drinks or soda. As a result, this variant of beverage exponentially escalated in production and consumption, leading to the rise of an alternative sector that replaced the preference for some years.

Manipulation

If coercion refers to the direct exercise of power, which is often supported by control over sources of uncertainty and key resources, then manipulation involves a less direct form of influence. It functions through carefully managing what is on the table for debate and who is able to participate in the debate (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963). Such agenda setting often relies on rhetorical and persuasion skills, and perhaps most importantly, access to key social networks. We suggest that this can operate through four sites: (1) manipulation in the organization that gives an organizational member power that goes beyond what a simple analysis of resources would predict, (2) broader processes of manipulation or persuasion undertaken by an organization as a whole in order to give it power over other actors such as external stakeholders, (3) control over processes of persuasion and networks which gives an actor or group power over an organization and finally (4) the use of manipulation to question and challenge the power of the focal organization.

Manipulation "In" organizations. Much of the literature on manipulation within organizations builds upon the insight that those who control scarce resources tend to also have power. However, this gives rise to an important question: why or how exactly did these people gain access to this power base? To address this question, many researchers have turned to processes of manipulation that utilize networks, impression management and strategic narratives.

Investigations focusing on the construction and leveraging of social networks have yielded very interesting findings regarding the way manipulation occurs in organizations (for a review see Kilduff & Brass, 2010). The central insight of this rich line of inquiry is that the building and maintenance of social networks is an important way power can be exercised *despite* the control over resources.

For example, evidence suggests that the power of a unit depends on its centrality within organizational social networks and the resources it controls (Hackman, 1985). According to Bozionelos' (2005) study of hiring decisions

in a university, network building and use of informal social connections can become a central aspect for swaying decisions. Such networks may enable alternative ways of enacting organizational designs, such as the implementation of new technology (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990). Related research has demonstrated how building co-operative ties within an organization can be an important way actors bypass resource dependencies and the political weaknesses that may engender (Gargiulo, 1993). Similarly, Gresov and Stephen's (1993) study of a large U.S. company found that inter-unit attempts to manipulate a political agenda were often triggered by resource constraints (Gresov & Stephen, 1993). Gender too may be an important factor is whether a social network is able to manipulate decision-making criteria within the organization (Ibarra, 1992; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993).

As well as building social networks to manipulate a political agenda, actors may also use more informal techniques in the organization. An early study conducted by Spekman (1979) demonstrated that if an actor occupies the position of a boundary spanner they are able to convey information that reduces uncertainty. This in turn tends to give them power within the organization. Maitlis' (2004) study of two symphony orchestras found that despite the lack of formal authority, directors were able to enact power through careful impression management. As a result, directors selectively shared information in order to protect their authority and manipulate core issues.

The role of impression management to manipulate the debates and issues in the organization was highlighted in a study of teaching hospitals in the U.S.A. (Roos & Hall, 1980). Departments that fostered higher levels of external credibility often had greater power within the organization. However, this additional power also provoked unwanted attention. Otherwise powerful and credible units became "garbage cans" where a wide range of complex issues was dumped (Roos & Hall, 1980). Nevertheless, the cultivation of external credibility allows actors to have a good deal of sway over the kind of issues that are considered important for the organization.

In a related area of research, it has been found that actors can manipulate organizational agendas by the proficient use of cultural resources such as stories, narratives, and rituals. For example, Humphreys and Brown's (2002) investigation of a UK teaching hospital found that power was exercised through the mobilization of stories and symbolism to legitimate technological change (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). What is particularly striking is that these stories were each crafted in quite different ways in order to appeal to different audiences. This suggests that the exercise of agenda manipulation depends on the ability to match stories with the target audience.

How technology is understood and used within the organization often relies upon political manipulation by actors to ensure that it serves their interests. Spicer's (2005) investigation of online innovations in an Australian public broadcaster found that various groups championed different representations

of the technology in order to manipulate its organizational legitimacy. In a similar study of technological implementation, Ball and Wilson (2000) found that the use of stories and narratives was central to the agenda setting process. However, these stories and narratives may have broader structural consequences such as the marginalization of women in the organization.

Manipulation "Through" organizations.   Organizations as a whole may resort to manipulating the political decision-making criteria of institutional fields, sectors, and other organizations beyond their boundaries. Manipulating external stakeholders and organizational sectors often relies upon other types of power, such as the coercion of the state or strong networks between the focal organization and other actors. However, it differs from coercion since it relies upon prefixing the decision-making parameters other actors use to make sense of what might be deemed reasonable behavior.

An early study of this process traced the role of lobbying by a range of organizations in shaping federal policy around business and economic issues of importance (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980). The investigation found businesses engaged in the selective provision of information to members of congress about particular topics of concern, but also sought to apply political pressure through bodies such as think tanks and action committees (which were a relatively unknown feature of politics when the study was written). This research found that coercive power—such as public pressure—tended to be far less effective in shaping legislation than manipulation. This is because the selective provision of information, informal political connections and the use of mediating bodies heightened the appearance of democratic deliberation, which direct force was less able to accomplish.

The importance of such manipulation "through" organizations was echoed in another investigation, which focused on the influence of the South Korean corporate elite (Siegel, 2007). This qualitative field study was coupled with extensive quantitative analysis to identify how ties with the political elite can shape the fate of particular corporate sectors. Siegel's (2007) study found that connections between the political and business elite were often based around fixed localities and stemmed from connections established in elite high schools and universities. This allowed the political elite to partially influence the agenda within large firms, and subtly manipulate decision-making frameworks therein. Following a major change in the makeup of the political elite, some corporations would lose power within the economy since state support was vital for business success, especially in relation to establishing cross-border alliances. Given the strong elite networks between the economy and state, governmental power holders are able to significantly influence corporate decisions while still appearing independent and far removed from particular business activities.

Organizations may also act as agents of manipulation by establishing certain boundary conditions that newcomers in the field must accept in order to legitimately do business. This is especially so in relation to first-mover entrepreneurial firms that have been influential in constructing the basic operating principles in a new sector or industry. For example, Santos and Eisenhardt (2009) noted the presence of manipulation in their study of entrepreneurial firms. These firms manipulated latecomers by establishing discursive boundaries that demarcated what is inside and outside the market. This type of power significantly shaped the internal agenda of organizations within this field, especially in relation to what was deemed acceptable and non-acceptable institutional practice. The exercise of this "soft power" allowed entrepreneurial organizations to gain dominance over other actors within a rapidly growing market.

Manipulation "Over" the organization.   Power may also be enacted over organizations through mechanisms of manipulation. This is where the agenda regarding the political issues that may and may not be discussed within the organization are controlled by informal actors or groups that sway important decisions. This may be achieved through social networks, direct attempts to engage influential actors to strengthen one's power over the firm, and the use of rhetorical appeals to maintain the certain operating norms within the organization. The research in this area suggests that these processes of manipulation may be used by actors within the firm (especially new arrivals with influential networks beyond the focal organization or department) and by agents external to the organization—including activists and shareholders.

Perhaps, the richest area pertaining to manipulation over the organization can be found in research exploring the role of social networks. For example, Allen and Panian (1982) demonstrate how family ties between an organization's CEO and the owning family is more likely to make the CEO less likely to be challenged on the basis of poor performance. The political agenda is influenced by the very ties that the CEO has to powerful parties. Other research highlights how a CEO's perceived power within broader social networks allows them to shape the nature and meaning of important decisions over the organization—such as accepting a market offer or not (D'Aveni & Kesner, 1993). These networks may also allow newcomers to exact more power over the nature of the organization. For example, a study of change in South Korean universities found that new arrivals were better able to manipulate the rationale for change if they were relatively familiar with powerful actors within the upper echelons of the university structure (Kim, Shin, Oh, & Jeong, 2007).

A related area of research highlights how CEOs can transform the overall direction of the organization, especially when they are deemed new arrivals.

The ability to manipulate social relations is important here. In a number of studies by Westphal (1998), Westphal and Bednar (2008), and Westphal and Stern (2006) it was shown that informal sources of power can allow the CEO to inordinately shift the nature of the firm in important ways. For example, in one study, it is reported that interpersonal influence mediates the role of influence that a CEO has over the organization (Westphal, 1998). Another investigation finds that CEOs who engage in ingratiating behavior toward fund managers are able to garner more power over their institution, as are the fund managers (Westphal & Stern, 2006). Such ingratiating behavior toward any given CEO is likely to shape whether a manager will be appointed to a board the CEO sits on and the agenda that determines such a decision (Westphal & Bednar, 2008). All these studies suggest that the informal manipulative dynamics are a vital mechanism for enabling CEOs to gain complete control over the organization.

There is a good deal of research that shows how sense-making and symbolism is crucial to manipulative power over an entire organization. When the change process is significant—often triggered by external stakeholders—the way the change is made sense of becomes central to compliance and buy-in. Clark (2004) provides an interesting example of this process of manipulation in relation to the massive post-soviet era restructuring of organizations in the Czech Republic. The study found that although managers faced significant constraints in their attempts to restructure the business, they were able to influence the business through careful symbolic and political manipulation. This established different paths for entirely restructuring these organizations. A decisive mediating role in an actor's ability to manipulate the sense-making properties of an organization is perceived self-empowerment. Lee (1999) found this in her investigation of a complaint lodged in a primary school by an external authority. To understand whether the complaint could be powerful enough to reorganize the school, the study found that managers could only do so if they manipulated member's sense-making attributes, which in turn depended on the self-perceptions of managers regarding their level of influence.

The role of external agents in gaining control over organizations has been studied in relation to manipulation. Maguire et al. (2004) present a germane example in their analysis of how HIV activists influenced the decision-making processes around the pricing and availability of anti-retroviral drugs produced by large pharmaceutical companies. The study found that activist groups mobilized a range of discourses in order to successfully manipulate the political agenda within the pharmaceutical firms in a number of ways.

The role of shareholders over organizations has also received attention in relation to manipulation. For example, David, Hitt, and Gimeno (2001) argue that the pre-existing structural advantage of powerful shareholders may allow them to champion for particular issues that would affect the

organization as a whole. David et al. (2001) demonstrate that shareholder activists often resorted to forms of power beyond the formal avenues they would normally use in having their voice heard. Informal influence, through networks and political campaigning, was utilized to place issues of concern on the agenda that would have never appeared otherwise.

Manipulation "Against" organizations. Manipulation can also occur "against" the organization. This is where the political agenda is shifted by broader stakeholders who oppose the operational principles of the focal organization, seeking to challenge its dominance by changing the terms of debate in a manner that undermines the status quo. From our evaluation of the literature, the process of manipulation generally occurs within the broader institutional environment that the organization exists, but in a way that disrupts the decision-making capacities and political agenda of the firm in question. Such activities are different to coercion against the organization (as discussed above) because it usually evokes public opinion, political values and rhetorical persuasion to turn consumers, government officials and even society against the firm. Three examples of management inquiry regarding this site of power are illustrative.

Böhm et al. (2008) examine the way in which the multinational firm is successfully challenged by various groups opposing international commodity chains, labor exploitation, and environmental damage. They evoke the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci to argue that these challenges are often achieved when new social movements manipulate the political climate in which firms garner legitimacy from important institutional supporters. They point to the example of the fast-food firm McDonalds. This company was successfully challenged by strategically undermining the legitimacy of the fast-food production process in relation to labor rights and the environment. The campaign manipulated the systems of representation that the firm had built into its brand, making it almost impossible for McDonald's to promote itself without also engaging with important social issues that the anti-McDonald's movement had raised against the multinational organization.

According to Böhm et al. (2008), the politics of manipulation over organizations appears to require more grassroots levels of activity. Because the focal firm—say, McDonalds—will generally not formally accept alternative narratives regarding its business practices, protest movements resort to informal and infra-political means to challenge the firm. This is what Carty (2002) found in her case study of Nike and the new social movement that opposed its extensive use of child labor and sweatshops in South East Asia. Social media and the Internet were vital for the relatively successful Anti-Nike campaign pursued by activists such as San Francisco-based Global Exchange. Manipulation occurred by generating and disseminating information about

the firm's employment practices to such an extent that consumer tastes radically altered. As a result, the organization was forced to acknowledge and debate the question of child labor, a task it was not well prepared for. The political agenda in and around the firm was significantly shifted, but most importantly, in a manner that Nike had no choice but to engage with.

The use of informal campaigning to manipulate the agenda so that organizations address certain social, political, and ethical issues often draws upon formal institutional actors to strengthen its cause. Palazzo and Richter (2005) note this in relation to the tobacco industry. For many years, the anti-smoking social movements were largely organized by civil society groups that aimed to raise awareness among consumers through informal marketing tactics. However, once NGOs, the World Health Organization and then governments were persuaded, the movement could more formally manipulate the agenda pertaining to the decision-making criteria used within large tobacco multinationals. As a result, companies like Philip Morris could no longer ignore the health effects of their products and were forced to participate in the debate—mainly with the help of lobbying groups and marketing consultants. As a consequence, their rhetoric turned from denial, to "consumer choice" and then to Corporate Social Responsibility, all of which have been successfully criticized by an emergent political agenda pertaining to deadly nature of the product.

Domination

Organizational political behavior mobilizes power through domination when actors seek to ideologically determine the terrain of action (and non-action) and thus attain certain political goals or curbing the articulation of other interests and voices. Ideology can be used for these ends when the cultural, normative, or symbolic environment is shaped (1) by powerful interests "in" the organization, (2) by actors "through" the organization, (3) by external actors "over" the organization to align institutional practices with a particular agenda, or (4) by competing interests "against" the organization. Domination differs from the preceding faces of power—coercion and manipulation—because it relies upon "soft constraint" (Clegg et al., 2006 to shape the logic of the organization and its field of action. Let us now survey the different sites where this face of power may be enacted in and around the contemporary organization.

Domination "In" organizations.   A good deal of the empirical research concerning domination focuses on its practice "in" the organization. These studies center on the way power can shape the normative climate of the organization to make its socially constructed reality (or its intentional change) seem inevitable and natural. Much of the research derives from a critical

understanding of power (Jermier, 1998). While certain organizational realities may appear to be the product of efficiency or functional necessity, research has identified the way this perception is actively molded by certain political interests. Accordingly, the question driving this stream of research is: why do subordinates frequently accept with their own subordination?

While traditional coercion and agenda manipulation may partly answer this question—especially in the context of labor market pressures and the "dull compulsion of economic necessity" (Marx, 1867/1972), investigations of workplace relations have also pointed to the ideological component that we have suggested is central to domination as an enactment of power (also see Courpasson, 2000). The advantage of this research is the way it demonstrates how vested interests use the veneer of "disinterestedness" to further certain objectives within the organization—usually in terms of consolidating asymmetrical social relations. For Benschop and Doorewaard (1998), this type of political activity might be referred to "hegemony". This is where the interests of a superordinate minority come to be perceived as the interests of all organizational members. The maintenance of such elite power often relies upon institutional resources to determine the "cultural rules" that govern the firm—such as organizational-wide appraisal systems (Barlow, 1989). Indeed, resource dependency theory has been particularly useful for studying how other organizational groups are ideologically co-opted by resource allocation opportunities (Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 2012; Ezzamel & Bourn, 1990).

An important facet of this face of power in organizations is the strategic use of autonomy and what critical labor process theorists label "indetermination". This is the gap between official management commands and their actual enactment by employees (Edwards, 1987; Sewell, 1998). The active consent and approval of subordinates—especially those that might otherwise be expected to resist—are often suggestive of the absence of power and control. However, research on organizational domination is useful for demonstrating how such consent can be manufactured, usually by enlisting and accentuating moments of self-determination, reputational self-management, and trust to further certain interests (Clegg & Courpasson, 2004; Reed, 2001; Romme, 1999). This type of organizational politics occurs in the everyday practices of organizational life, often times somewhat removed from the structures of power indicative of coercion and manipulation (Gordon, Kornberger, & Clegg, 2009). For those in the upper echelons of the organization, domination is considered especially effective because the perception that the firm is highly political (in the traditional sense of the term of overt actor bias and agenda following) may have a major negative impact on job satisfaction and loyalty (Gandz & Murray, 1980).

A useful example of how domination evokes the everyday activities of workers in order to depoliticize an otherwise political environment can be

found in Contu and Willmott's (2003) excellent analysis of organizational learning. As they suggest, nothing could be considered less political than learning. How could anyone be "against" learning? However, they demonstrate how this semblance of neutrality is used to effectively justify and sanction particular relations of inequality within organizations, especially between top management and lower ranking members. As Blacker and McDonald (2000) and Vince (2001) also note in their investigations of organizational learning, for many employees, this variant of power is difficult to resist because the ideological terrain of the "learning organization" and "organizational knowledge" depoliticizes concrete power differentials, making them appear unquestionable and beyond debate (also see Swan & Scarborough, 2005).

Domination might also be an important face of power in organizations when some kind of change program is introduced, especially if the change is expected to prompt opposition or dissent. For example, in their study of the introduction of a highly contested Total Quality Management system in a UK bank, Knights and McCabe (1997, 1998) argue that the discursive delivery of such management systems is symbolically orchestrated to make them appear inevitable and without alternative. Similarly, Feldman (1989) argues that regimes of technology are inscribed with "idealized" attributes—often entailing psychodynamic processes that make them difficult to question, even when organizational members feel threatened and discontented by them (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; Bloomfield & Hayes, 2009).

Investigations of domination in organizations have also been helpful for understanding how minority or marginalized groups are incorporated into structures that first appear against their political interests. The study of professions is noteworthy in this regard. According to Guest and King's (2004) analysis of human resource managers, for example, these groups frequently feel marginalized by the organizational power elite, and attempt to garner legitimacy by over-identifying with the vocabulary and symbolic attributes of the very actors they feel disenfranchised by (also see Brivot, 2011; Waring & Currie, 2009). Similar processes of domination occur in relation to gender and ethical minority groups. According to Wiley and Eskilson's investigation (1982), for example, successful managers require "male" attributes, which both excludes woman and incorporates them into the organizational structure as they seek to compete with males. Such domination is often subtly bolstered by network opportunities with influential actors, which are inexplicably absent for those who do not meet the while/male norms and ideational frameworks that underlie institutional life (Ibarra, 1995).

Domination "Through" organizations.   The next site of domination pertains to the way organizations might behave as actors in their own right to manage, change, and control other institutional players within the field. This differs domination "in" the organization because it focuses on the way

organizations as a whole may act as agents to ideologically dominate stakeholders, competitors, and customers to achieve desirable outcomes and goals. At this site of analysis, domination functions outwards rather than inwards—even though there might obviously still be processes of domination occurring within its organizational boundaries. The emphasis of these studies is on the normative, cultural, and ideological facet of power, determining the institutional environment through shaping the values and preferences of other actors for vested purposes (Barley, 2010). Three research areas focus on domination "through" organizations.

Organizations have long been known to dominate state, civil society, and other important actors through ideological framing and political lobbying (Clegg, 1990; Lukes, 2005; Mills, 1965). Given the rise of the corporation in the West, political scientists and sociologists have revealed how corporations can influence democratic agendas to serve their narrow interests (Perrow, 1990). However, given the importance of this issue today, management research has recently turned to study it too, especially in relation to the corporation's power to determine governmental and civil society issues through it sheer institutional dominance.

In Barley's (2010) excellent analysis of elites, lobbying and the hegemonic status of the corporation in the U.S.A. is illustrative of how organizations can ideologically determine other actors to further their interests. For Barley (2010), while political science and sociology has a strong tradition of focusing on this topic, organization theorists have typically down played the way organizations can act as political "game changers" within the governmental sector: "although organizational theorists have given much attention to how environments shape organizations, they have given much less attention to how organizations mold their environments" (p. 777).

The important aspect of Barley's (2010) study for us is the way corporate influence is not simply a correlate of "raw" economic might. A massive amount of lobbying and "politicking" is required to shape the moral preferences and ideological tenor of governmental officials in order to gain advantageous legislation and policy outcomes. According to Barley (2010), ideological domination is achieved as soon as corporate institutions separate citizenry power from economic power, which is achieved through campaigning for the predominance of economic rationality over other modes of ethical reasoning (also see Reed, 2012).

Similar processes of domination are revealed in Kerr and Robinson's (2012) analysis of the rise of the Scottish banking sector. This study seeks to understand how a relatively national and conservative industry rose to become a leader in global finance. They map the ideological struggle that was waged between the banking elite, national governmental regulators, and international bodies. One of the chief means these banks used to become influential players in global financial was unrelenting lobbying in order to dominate the moral

perceptions of lawmakers and regulators. Banking elites convinced the institutional field of the unquestionable superiority of economic reason, establishing its ideological authority over other actors that only relaxed after the global economic crisis.

A similar method of domination through organizations has been noted in relation to climate change and the subduing of environmental activists. Levy and Egan (2003) studied eight European and U.S. automobile firms and oil companies to illustrate how these corporations have attained an ideological hegemony over governmental decision-makers in relation to climate change. In particular, these organizations shaped the ideological environment by using civil society forums. While various NGOs and activist groups contested this intrusion, firms were still able to use their access to constrain the broader political landscape in significant ways (also see Topal, 2009). Indeed, on a global scale, this ideological capture of governmental interests has even justified the use of violence to quell oppositional groups, as Banerjee (2008) notes in relation to his notion of "necrocapitalism".

Domination through organizations is often not as straightforward as the above cases would have us believe. Influencing an organizational field frequently involves complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities in practice. This is what Davenport and Leitch (2005) discovered in their study of a public research agency in New Zealand. Rather than directly lobby for ideological support, the agency intentionally fostered a "strategic ambiguity" within its goals in order to align disparate stakeholders. Indeed, in the context of low institutional supports, as was the case in the Ghanaian organizations studied by Lyon (2006), ideological domination was secured through informal bonds of trust and cooperation. While having the same effect of straightforward ideological domination, networks of trust are more difficult to resist since they appeared to be based upon loyalty and friendship rather than political and economic dependence.

Domination "Over" organizations.   The third face of power in our framework attends to the way organizations can be controlled, shaped, and influenced by putatively external factors. This face of power, as we have already mentioned, pertains to field level determinants that can exert force over the focal institution. This perspective points to exogenous influences—be they from merging firms, the state apparatus and resource rich partners. However, as also revealed in earlier sections, given the highly networked and interconnected nature of contemporary organizational firms, agents within the organization may also enact such external influence. For example, the financialization of many organizational fields has fostered ideological frames that are enforced by within-firm members (e.g. financial modeling, appraisal systems, etc.) even though the initial catalyst derived from the broader environmental context (Morgan & Sturdy, 2000). Moreover, extra-organizational

networks can overwhelm decisions made within organizations given the wider community of interests and political maneuvering that they may represent (McGivern & Dopson, 2010).

As with the above sites of power, domination focuses on the role that ideological and cultural conditioning has from external stakeholders on the focal organization. Pfeffer's book *The External Control of Organizations* (2003) initiated a rich avenue of conceptualizing how firms are often embedded in webs of influence that they are dependent upon in order to act. As Pfeffer (2003) explains, "the need for resources including financial and physical resources as well as information, obtained from the environment, made organizations dependent on the external sources of these resources" (p. xii). We suggest that such influence may also include ideological forms that organizations are required to adopt in order to achieve their goals; either as precondition for resource allocation or as an outcome of interconnected networks between organizational decision-makers and the external institutional field. We identify four key areas of research that have focused on domination over organizations.

First, organizations are often enabled and constrained by the ideological context imposed upon them by the national state and governmental apparatus. Numerous studies have demonstrated how the state plays an important role in ideological directing the activities of organizations, especially corporations within the international domain (Goodstein & Velamuri, 2009). For example, in their comparative study between France and South Korea, Yoo and Lee (2009) identify high levels of interconnectedness between state officials and the corporate sector. While this cross-pollination of public and private personnel is not in itself unusual, they reveal the influence that governmental agency exerted on business firms in terms of national economic welfare and development. These values became highly integrated into the business models of competitive corporations in significant ways. Similarly, but with opposite moral outcomes, Frenkel (2001) discovered in his study of apparel contractors that were attempting to implement more humanitarian supply chains that the state was the main obstacle to this change. Field level pressures from governmental agencies—especially hostile to labor unions—ideologically captured these firms, making ethical business look less attractive and worthwhile.

Second, organizations may also be ideologically dominated by the economic environment in which they operate, sending important signals regarding how the firm ought to manage its internal functions. The increasing financial integration of organizations is especially relevant here. Pye (2002) found in a study of 12 large UK firms how the shift of power from executive boards to fund managers re-scripted the "sense-making" attributes of organizational members. Short-term shareholder value became the dominant ideological purpose of the firm, often at the expense of more sustainable business practices.

A similar process was noted in Tengblad's (2004) qualitative study of eight CEOs in Sweden. Financial expectations gradually shaped the CEOs sense of purpose and these values were then passed down the hierarchy to foster conformity among employees. In this way, actors within these organizations feel "managed by the market" (Davis, 2009) rather than immediate CEOs.

Third, mergers, acquisitions, and inter-organizational collaborations can also have "external control" effects in organizations, significantly shaping the ideological climate of the firm. For example, Vaara and Tienari's (2011) qualitative investigation of a multinational corporations (MNC) merger reveals how a discursive struggle ensued around the dominant cultural tenor of both firms. The more powerful organization deployed a range of instruments of symbolic domination to change the ideological values of the weaker organization, changing the everyday business practices of its members. A similar discursive struggle was observed in consulting projects conducted between firms by Levina and Orlikowski (2009). And Schneper and Guillen's (2004) quantitative study of takeovers in 37 countries also demonstrates, ideology is often central to these initiatives. In particular, they found that shareholders often gained the upper hand in the firms they studied, especially by lobbying governmental lawmakers to grant them more ideological influence over the day-to-day functions of organizations.

Domination "Against" organizations. Viewing organizations as political systems can also alert researchers to the way they may be actively opposed, challenged, and resisted by other stakeholder groups who seek to undermine their authority, legitimacy, and even their existence. The critical management studies literature has particularly been attuned to this aspect of power and politics (Fleming & Spicer, 2007). As observed in the previous sections, contesting the organization frequently occurs through coercion and manipulation. However, ideological domination may also play an important role. NGOs in the Global South, for example, often seek to challenge both the effectiveness and normative legitimacy of status quo business practices to achieve change (Kahn, Muni, & Willmott, 2007). The objective of these interventions is to ideologically capture the organization within its own value system and render them redundant and/or undesirable.

The rise of new social movements has been a keen focus of research in this area. These countervailing organizational forms are especially drawn to ideological domination because they are driven by political and moral commitments (Melucci, 1989). In their analysis of the growth of the "slow food movement" in the UK between 1986 and 2010, Van Bommel and Spicer (2011) present an analysis of domination against the organization. With the rise of oligopolistic fast-food chains and supermarket stores, the slow food movement sought to challenge the hegemonic status of speed, convenience,

and ease of access. This in turn would replace these values with one's that were considered more sustainable.

For Van Bommel and Spicer, there are two important dimensions to this form resistance, both of which seek to disincentivize the consumer from engaging with mainstream food organizations by presenting more environmentally friendly alternatives. First of all, the slow food movement did not seek to completely repudiate the ideological importance of speed and convenience. Instead, they aimed to redefine them in a manner that revealed how they could be achieved outside of the corporation's field. Speed and efficiency are better served without the complex and non-transparent commodity chains, which ought to be secondary to price considerations. Second, the slow movement evoked consumer health as a point of contention, ideologically casting large firms as fundamentally antithetical to the nutritional needs of everyday citizens.

Hensman (2003) presents another interesting example of how organizations can be ideologically dominated and replaced by alternative institutional forms. This study examines the rise of the Internet music industry and the way it culturally usurped major entertainment corporations. Organizations like Napster, for example, challenged status quo organizations by exploiting the emergence of new technological developments. Their ideological campaign was twofold. First, these disruptive organizations promoted an alternative that was more aligned with consumer choice. Rather than consumer tastes being dictated by impersonal multinational corporations, a richer variety of options could be catered to via Internet-based broadcasters. Second, the ease of access that Internet technology allowed meant that consumers could enjoy their music instantly. The success of this ideological challenge led to the significant decline of traditional entertainment organizations and even the demise of some.

Subjectification

As noted in the earlier sections of this paper, the notion of subjectification suggests that power may run deeper than ideology. The concepts of subjectivity, identity, and selfhood are important in this regard because they allow us to observe the way organizational members are regulated through forms of control that become inextricably linked to one's sense of personhood.

The notion of subjectification is derived from post-structuralism and postmodernist approaches to power. This research area aims to disrupt traditional approaches to the topic in two ways. First of all, what appears to be ostensibly free behavior in organizations—namely the lack of coercive, manipulative, and ideological domination—may in fact have strong power-related qualities. Knights and Willmott (1989) call this an analytical transition "from degradation to subjugation". And second, the medium that this power functions

through has agential qualities that have generally been considered somehow outside of political influence (Costea, Crump, & Amiridis, 2008). This is why identity and selfhood feature so prominently in this research. Let us now turn to the way this face of power maps onto the four sites we have discussed previously.

Subjectification "In" organizations. By far the most studies of this face of power focus on its achievement (and resistance) in organizations. This research suggests that this face of power aims to constitute or "craft" (Kondo, 1990) identities in organization so that actors manage themselves on the behalf of vested interests, often in the name of free self-expression, autonomy, and career development. Some of the earliest studies of subjection can be found in the Critical Labor Process area—especially as it began to turn away from Marxian concerns to more Foucauldian concepts.

In their study of UK banks, Knights and McCabe (1998) and McCabe (2000, 2004) illustrate the way power functions to align employees' sense of self with the changing managerial goals of the firm. Past understandings of selfhood associated with an earlier management approach were chastised and became sources of existential insecurity, while the new identities promoted by management were considered more worthwhile and virtuous. The study is noteworthy since subjectification was observed to have a strong emotional and psychodynamic aspect. It infiltrates the very heart of the employee and is thus difficult to identify as a form of power by those subjected to it (also see Fineman & Sturdy, 1999; Gabriel, 1999; Sturdy, 1997).

The importance of the Michel Foucault in management studies regarding how subjectification functions in organizations must be noted. He argued that disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) and discourse (Foucault, 1982) were central for moving our analyses of power beyond the ideology concept, revealing how power reaches into the very grain of individuals. A wide range of research has drawn upon these ideas to explain the subjectification of organizational actors. As a mode of power, discourse is argued to have constructive properties rather than mere representative ones (Hardy & Phillips, 1999). This approach shifts the focus beyond ideological considerations because there is no authentic or true self prior to the appearance of power. As such, the power of subjection lies the way it can create discursive or narrative "truth effects" that are lived on an everyday subjective basis (Boje, 1995; Riad, 2005).

For example, Townley (1993) has pointed to the way human resource management (HRM) can become a powerful "dominant discourse" through appraisal and performance measures that employees absorb as their own. She suggests that employees who feel precarious are more likely to feel the need to internalize this discourse in order to appear favorable to superiors. Similar results have been noted in relation to the way management accounting

systems (Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998), project management (Clegg, Pitsis, & Rura-Polley, 2002; Hodgson, 2002), diversity (Zanoni & Janssens, 2004), strategy (Knights & Morgan, 1991; Laine & Vaara, 2007), and billable hours (Brown & Lewis, 2011) can exert a discursive pressures that subjectify subordinates in this manner.

According to Foucault (1977), disciplinary power often regulates social actors through self-regulation—whereby we literally embody the directives of the organization and enforce it upon our identities, aspirations, and relations with others. This has made the topic of self-disciplining identities an important focus in this area of research. Alvesson and Willmott (2002) refer to "identity work" to capture this element of disciplinary power. They found in their study that identity regulation in the workplace revolves around an ideal employee self. This prompts self-management among organizational members, which reconstructs employee subjectivity in certain ways (also see Karreman & Alvesson, 2001). As Kenny (2012) also argues, this may be exacerbated by a need for recognition among the workforce, especially when they feel vulnerable to shifting political alliances within the firm. This finding is supported by Thornborrow and Brown's (2009) fascinating analysis of disciplinary power in a paratrooper regiment. The ideal-self promoted by the regiment was almost impossible to achieve, and in failing to do so the regiment effectively disciplined themselves in significant ways (also see Brown & Coupland, 2005; Brown, Kornberger, Clegg, & Carter, 2010).

Other studies have focused on the organizational technologies, teamwork and infrastructure that may promote such self-disciplining identities. Electronic surveillance is particularly salient in this research. Sewell and Wilkinson (1992) provide a classic analysis of subjectification in their study of a firm implementing total quality management (TQM) and teamwork. The electronics factory utilized peer pressure and visible performance indicators to discipline it workers, resulting in workers feeling inadequate about themselves as they embodied the regime within their sense of identity (also see Barker, 1993; Casey, 1995). Because the spatial arrangement of the plant resembled a "panopticon", the managerial gaze was always present among employees, to the extent where they enacted its influence upon themselves and fellow workers (also see Halford & Leonard, 2006).

Knights and Murray's (1992) investigation of an insurance firm introducing new information systems similarly demonstrates how the new climate of "transparency" substantially changed the way workers understood themselves and their roles, revealing the insidious social power of technology when enacted within certain political settings (also see Ball & Wilson, 2000; Bloomfield & Danieli, 1995; Coombs, Knights, & Willmott, 2002).

Subjectification, however, does not go uncontested. It gives rise to its own set of political struggles within organizations. For example, Alvesson and Willmott (2002) found in their study of identity regulation in organizations

that employees drew upon other notions of self—especially those related to non-work—to resist subjectification. In a related investigation, Dick and Cassell (2002) observed organizational actors constructing counter-discourses to create a mental space to avoid complete subjectification in their study of police officers in the UK. And Thomas and Davies's (2005) analysis of New Public Management in the UK also found a raft of "micro-political" practices in which employee's contested subjectification through alternative understandings of collective selfhood.

Subjectification "Through" organization.   Now we turn to how organizations themselves may utilize the power of subjectification to enact changes in its broader institutional field. With respect to this site of subjectification, we differentiate it from coercion, manipulation, and ideological domination in a number of ways. First, this mode of power seeks to change a particular organizational field by reconstituting the identities of other actors, using the focal organization to do so. Second, this implies some kind of "activism" since the focal organization aims to persuade other institutional actors to adopt a subjective position that may be significantly different to the one they currently occupy. Different ways of being in relation to a particular "topic" or "issue" are especially salient in this research. And third, subjectification through organization requires certain maintenance protocols to keep the pressure on and avoid institutional reversals.

Moreover, these elements of subjectification thus differentiate it from those practices we noted in the previous section regarding processes "in" organizations. This is because external actors have more choice and autonomy to refuse subjectification than those dependent upon the organization for employment. Accordingly, the emphasis is less on Foucauldian themes such as "self-discipline" and identity-regulation and more on discursive construction, active persuasion and overt politicking. For example, Hardy and Phillips (1999) argue in their study of refugee and immigrant rights groups in Canada that "organizations often engage in discursive struggle as they attempt to shape and manage the institutional field of which they are a part" (p. 1). Like other studies of this type, the emphasis is on how subjective meaning (in this case, the idea of the "refugee") is actively managed by discourses, which in turn are deployed by organizations to change the way actors identify with certain issues.

A number of key studies have revealed the processes and complexities involved in subjectification through organizations. In their study of attempts to change attitudes about forced marriage in the UK, Goss, Jones, Betta, and Latham (2011) argue that "emancipatory entrepreneurship" was indispensable to the way oppositional movements installed a different sense of self toward forced marriage. Goss et al. (2011) suggest that Sanghera used the anti-forced-marriage movement to mobilize a wide range of alternative identities

or "subject positions" that members of the relevant community might occupy. This allowed the male community to detach themselves from the stereotypical identities that sanctioned coerced wedlock and thus approach the issue from more liberating perspectives.

Following Goss et al., three process of subjectification are particularly useful for the purposes of our paper. First, tactics of subjectification focused on "micro-processes" of power within the community. This means that identity is not something that "floats" in an acontextual way, but fundamentally linked to what Goss et al. call rituals of power: everyday activities underlying the maintenance of identities that accept forced marriage. Second, these rituals have a very strong emotional component, a feature that Sanghera as an emancipatory entrepreneur used to rescript understandings of females as free agents. And third, the process of subjectification is ongoing and requires "institutional work" in order to perpetuate an identity that found force marriage "shameful" among the male population.

Benjamin and Goclaw (2005) provide another example of how organizations utilize subjectification to change broader institutional fields. They investigated how professional associations in Israel—specializing in human resource and personnel management—changed the industry-wide perception that non-standard employment (NSE) results in organizational inefficiencies. Using critical discourse analysis, Benjamin and Goclaw suggest that active lobbying and discursive persuasion was central to discrediting the idea among managers that NSE was unfair and bad for business. This change was brought about by reorientating the subjective connotations (especially for themselves) that NSE practices signified for human resource managers. Important to this discursive realignment was to have managers approach the subject as "a gesture of concern for employees in non-standard arrangements" (Benjamin & Goclaw, 2005, p. 737).

Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) present another interesting case of subjectification through organizations. They investigated the discursive contestation that ensued when a Big Five accounting firm purchased a law enterprise, and thus establishing a multidisciplinary partnership. Professional law bodies fiercely contested the initiative. According to Suddaby and Greenwood, profound institutional change occurred through the use of a new rhetoric concerning the legitimacy of the project. This shifted the field in a manner that allowed actors to subjectively identify with the new multidisciplinary form. Crucial to this subjective realignment was the use of rhetoric that provided new spaces for an identity comfortable with the accounting/law partnership. Expertise was particularly important for this industry-wide change in actor perceptions of legitimacy.

Subjectification "Over" organizations. We now take the perspective of a focal organization being influenced by the broader field of institutions and

how subjectification "over" this organization may occur. As with the previous sections dealing with this site of power, studies have identified a range of influences, pressures, and forces that can stem from the environment to change the way organizations operate. This perspective shift is noteworthy since it does not focus so much on how actors may seek to change others (related to power "in" and "through" organizations) but instead the way external change agents can instigate subjective and identity-related permutations that reorientate how organizational members manage themselves.

Most of the research dealing with subjectification "over" organizations tends to study governmental influence on the focal organization. This could be for a number of reasons. First, it might be argued that subjectifying power frequently relies on a coercive backdrop in order to function. For example, in our above discussion of subjectification "in" organizations, we noted that it is probably due to the deep dependency that members have in the firm that accounts for their willingness to participate in subjectifying power relations (Fleming, 2014). In this sense, governments lay down the "rules of the game" that all societal institutions must abide by. Second, the neoliberal reforms that many governments have promoted over the last 20 years have seen traditional organizational forms—schools, public service agencies, and so forth—being fundamentally restructured (Friedland & Alford, 1991). A major part of this process involved subjectification.

A good example of this site of subjectification (and the resistance it may provoke) can be found in Spicer and Sewell's (2010) investigation of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), a public media organization. They chart the governmental attempt to shift the internal structures of the organization toward more market-based principles over a 40-year period. In the final phase of the reform, it was the very ethos and identities of its employees that was targeted by power. The public media provider was to become more enterprising, capitalistic, and economically focused in its approach to the media. Of course, coercion, manipulation, and ideological domination were all present here. However, this study is particular attuned to the attempts to have ABC employees subjectively and even existentially identify with the values of profit-maximization. Much protest resulted, with some journalists seeking to encourage traditional media ethics among the public (including associations such as "Friends of the ABC"). Despite this resistance, the new commercial ethic was ultimately established.

In another Australian study focusing on subjectification "over" organization, Brown, Ainsworth, and Grant (2012) conducted an analysis of the discursive realignment of identity around aged-care. A governmental review of aged-care sought to redefine the meaning and connotations of age with respect to the elderly and young. Rather than frailty, for example, being the key signifier of the aged, the review sought to recast service users in more economic terms, based upon independence and self-management. It is interesting

to note that care providers themselves were the main target of this discourse and its subjectifying effects. Caregivers were no longer social good providers but the enterprising managers of a commercial commodity. In this respect, power became deeply embedded in the very identities of these occupational groups.

A number of other studies have focused on the reform of public institutions from the perspective of subjectification. For example, Oakes et al. (1998) investigated the introduction of "business planning" models in a number of Canadian museums. The authors demonstrate how this entailed a fundamental discursive realignment of how employees identified with their roles. Prior to the initiative workers valued each other for their "cultural capital". Consequently, however, they perceived themselves as "entrepreneurs" whose mission was to add economic value. A similar study was conducted by Ezzamel (1994) in relation to the imposition of accounting methodologies in a UK university. The transparency provided by the new program subjectified actors by creating "truth effects" around the economic viability of the organization. As a result, the accounting mentality was deeply inscribed into the everyday identity work of employees, reshaping their very sense of self in terms of commercialism and potentially expendable human resources.

The cultural dynamics of post-merger organizational relations have been the topic of numerous studies, as noted in the sections above. Subectification "over" organizations as a site of power might be useful for understanding this phenomenon too. For example, Clark and Geppert (2011) emphasize this form of power in their investigation of the way a post-Soviet organization merged into a Western MNC context. Given the divergence of cultural values between the two organizations, the researcher's note how a new set of "sense-making" protocols were produced in order for Western commercial values to become internalized by employees. This occurred to such an extent that workers found that their basic identities as social subjects were fundamentally reshaped.

Subjectification "Against" organizations. The final site of subjectification pertains to those processes used to function "against" organizations. This site of power differs from coercion, manipulation, and domination since power seeks to recast organizational members in a manner that essentially changes their self-identity rather than the structural and ideological milieu. According to our review of the management and organization science literature, this site of power has received less attention. This could be for a number of reasons. First, actors seeking to resist or oppose dominant organizations have little technical access to the flows of identity within the firm. This is perhaps why coercion, manipulation, and ideological domination (especially through social movements) are considered more favorable modes of contestation. Second, as we noted above, subjectification requires a strong institutional

background—formal or legitimate authority, for example—to take hold. Therefore, subjectification is probably the last in a sequence of actions used to capture the organization. In this respect, its empirical enactment is perhaps overshadowed by preceding moments of power and politics.

The research we have found dealing with this site of subjectification generally focuses on employee oppositional movements to a focal organizational. This is especially so in relation to worker initiatives seeking to take over the management of the institution in question. According to Adler's (2001) excellent analysis of "trust" in post-Fordist knowledge firms, contemporary organizations have become so reliant on anti-hierarchical flows of cooperation, work processes have begun to outpace traditional power relations related to the capitalist employer/employee relationship. This may have laid the foundations for "post-capitalist" ideas among the workforce. This development noted by Adler (2001) may explain the rationale behind employee attempts to formally valorize their latent autonomy and self-management abilities, redefining the social meaning of work organizations in the process.

Given the deeply entrenched status of capitalist power relations, employee takeovers require more than coercion, manipulation, and domination. An elementary alteration in what being a "worker" means is also necessary. This is where subjectification plays an important role. Examples of this in management and organizational science can be found in investigations of employee-led takeovers of organizations. Hammer and Stern (1980) studied an employee buyout of a furniture factory and the ensuing power struggles that followed. The major obstacle for unions was to convince not only industry leaders but also its *own* employee membership that this could be a successful venture. This was done by promoting an alternative self-identity among workers, especially in relation to the virtues of self-management and autonomy (also see Harrison 1994).

One interesting tactic used by employees to enact subjectification "over" organizations is the use of rhetoric already promoted by dominant management discourses. Again, this resonates with Adler's (2001) observation that because self-management and autonomy are the basis of much value-adding activities in post-Fordist firms, the possibility of their full realization has become an important leveraging moment in organizational politics. McCabe (2009) noted this in his study of a UK bank. Employees turned the discursive idealization of self-regulation against the firm to again fuller control over it. In this sense, they over-identified with their own subjectification as self-regulating actors, and thus told top management that if they were to authentically embody the prescribed identity of "responsible subjects" they would have to be fundamentally involved in the day-to-day operation of the bank (also see Fleming & Spicer, 2003). While this did not result in a complete employee takeover, it did partially "resubjectify" the organization to create a new discursive institutional climate (also see Sutherland et al., in press).

Meyerson and Scully's (1995) fascinating analysis of "tempered radicals" extends our understanding of these counter-subjectifying tactics in organizations. These individuals slowly and patiently change the way leaders understand themselves in relation to important social justice issues within the firm. As such, tempered radicals do not attempt to take complete power or overtly revolt against the status quo. Instead, they change the building-blocks of identity by raising obvious injustices from within, hoping to make deep subjective connections between powerful decision-makers and a legitimate political cause (e.g. gender inequality, homophobia, violence, and environmental degradation). Often times these issues are already prominent within the broader political landscape and are translated into everyday politics within the firm by conscious objectors. Following the internal politicking of the tempered radical, a leader might ask themselves: "am I the kind of person who would represent an institution that condones and perpetuates such injustices?"

Evaluation and Future Areas of Research

We often think of organizational power as the enactment of direct force by an actor over others. However, as our review reveals, power is not only exercised through highly visible acts of direction or even back room politicking. It also infuses many of the systems, processes, ideas and even identities that organizations constitute. Moreover, the research we have reviewed emphasizes the point that the politics of organizational life goes far beyond the boardroom. We have seen that political dynamics associated with power can develop in the most unlikely crevices of the organization. They can be found on the shop floor, in the cramped offices of middle managers and in the high-level interactions between senior executives and governments. Moreover, the rise of new social movements around an array of issues directly concerning organizations has placed the question of power at the heart of important debates occurring in many societies today. This is especially so given the veritable explosion of alternative social media formats. All of this tells us that organizational power is not just multidimensional, but also multi-sited and increasingly contested.

In the discussion section, we seek to build on these insights in order to identify some novel trajectories for future research. In order to do this we will identify four areas where we think novel research questions may lie: (1) overarching points of agreement in the literature which might be problematized, (2) ongoing tensions or points of debate which may prompt further inquiry, (3) emerging issues which we have noted in recent studies but require further research and (4) neglected issues that may offer opportunities for future exploration. In each of these sections, we will draw out a set of potential future research questions that might be asked in order to move the agenda forward.

Agreements

As noted in the previous section, the literature on power is broad and touches on a wide variety of different phenomena. It also uses very different sources of theoretical inspiration to understand these disparate phenomena. But in spite of this significant diversity, there appear to be some important commonalities that cut across the literature. Four notable assumptions we would like to discuss are that power (1) is largely informal in organizations, (2) structured around uncertainty, (3) impersonal, and (4) requires some degree of meaning or justification.

Instead of treating these assumptions as a point of positive knowledge, we will seek to problematize (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) these broad points of agreement. This involves critically analyzing the agreed assumptions and in some cases reversing them. By doing this, it is possible to generate novel research questions for future research.

The first crosscutting assumption appears to be that organizational power largely operates in an informal manner (Mechanic, 1962). Much of the research points out that only focusing on formal positions of power can blind us to the central dynamics through which power actually functions. These dynamics include the control of organizational specific resources (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1974), the development of social networks (Brass, 1990) and the ability to use language in a persuasive fashion (Brown, 1978). In order to study power, we must look beyond the position and register less visible aspects of political life. This is why, we suggest, a sometimes heated struggle that can flare up around what often seem like insignificant issues. For instance, think of redistribution of office space and the vicious political contestation this can inspire. Such struggles are due to the fact that what is at stake is not just a workspace, but resonate with broader aspects of symbolic power, one's position in a social network and one's sense of self (Taylor & Spicer, 2007).

The assumption that power works through informal mechanisms is widespread, but it may be questioned. For example, we might identify cases where informal power relations do *not* matter and whether they are simply a distraction from the real political action in an organization. Asking such a question might yield some interesting insights into how the attention of actors is directed to particular avenues that may prove to be important or otherwise. In addition, we might ask why organizations tend to cling to positions of formal authority—often with great fervor—given its secondary status in getting things done. This is strange if informal power relations are the most important aspect of organizational life. Perhaps, formal positions of authority are not just an expression of power, but more related to other issues, including organizational ethics or codes of justice (Du Gay, 2000).

This tension between formality/informality is played out most conspicuously among new social movements and their attempts to change the status

quo in and around organizations. As many of the studies we have discussed in this paper contend, these collective movements are often born from dissatisfaction with formal institutional forums because certain concerns remain unvoiced (Melucci, 1989). However, as they gain legitimacy and are included in more traditional decision-making settings, they assume formalized qualities, some of which are contested by the social movement themselves because it is deemed to compromise their effectiveness (e.g. see Crane & Matten's, 2012 discussion of Greenpeace). This dynamic alerts us to the ambivalent question of whether power is most effectively enacted through formal or informal social structures and enactments.

The second assumption cutting across this research is that power is structured around uncertainty or the ability to control uncertainty (Hickson et al., 1971). Those actors are powerful who can control uncertainty using a range of mechanisms, including scarce resources, networks, ideologies, and identities. By managing uncertainty, it is possible to assuage anxieties triggered by not knowing exactly what an outcome might be. In the review section, we discussed a classic statement of this in a study conducted by Crozier (1964). He found that the ability to reduce uncertainty through specialist skills was central in a tobacco factory. This insight has been carried into studies on resource dependency that explain why resources are the central mechanism through which ambiguity is managed in organizations. More subtle forms of power such as ideology and the construction of subjective identity may also be a mechanism for reducing uncertainty and the anxiety which comes with it (Knights & Willmott, 1989). Undergirding this argument is the assumption that organizations as whole tend to abhor uncertainty, which means they require processes for banishing it. Power is one of the most important ways they do this.

Some novel problems appear when we question this assumption. Rather than providing certainty in an uncertain world, perhaps power may enact the opposite outcome. In other words, power might create a sense of uncertainty in a world that is actually relatively unambiguous and systematic. Powerful actors may actively foster uncertainties in the allocation of resources, social networks, ideologies, and identities (Jauch & Kraft, 1986). For example, managers may gain influence by creating deep uncertainty around the distribution of resources, employment relationships, decision-making criteria, and social identities (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2006). Examining the power of ambiguity "in", "though", "over", and "against" organizations may yield of some potentially surprising insights.

The third assumption in much of the literature points to the fact that organizational power is often impersonal. That is to say, power is typically not seen as a property of an individual, but somehow operates "through" people (Clegg, 1989). For example, actors gain power by being in a fortuitous position in a social network (Burt, 1992) or using a particular discourse rather than being

powerful in and of themselves (Mumby, 1988). This in turn implies that it is possible to abstract power from particular individuals and identify how it functions through particular situations and events. In this sense, power becomes something curiously disembodied. Following this, it has become fashionable for researchers to largely focus on how power plays out through relatively abstract categories and positions rather than concrete acts and bodies.

This assumption may be problematized by demonstrating how power is often not experienced as an abstract process but deeply embodied in a particular person or event (Styhre, 2004). The research on ideological domination and subjectification, for example, frequently misses this because it reduces power to an abstract category that is removed from existential corporeality and lived experience. How might we bring concrete individuals back into the research agenda concerning organizational power? Perhaps researchers might follow Canetti's (1962) suggestion that the clenched fist or tense shoulder muscle is often the root expression of power. This would allow us to inquire about the ways power is expressed, felt and made personal through bodies. Moreover, this would shift our attention to the toll that expressions of power can take on the body, and how bodies get disciplined into regimes of power (Michel, 2011)

The final widely held assumption is that organizational power generally appears when there is some kind of indeterminacy and agency (Arendt, 1958). That is to say, power tends to function in contexts where there is the possibility an actor may *not* follow the demands the powerful place on them. The classic expression of such indeterminacy can be found in labor process theory whereby power is enacted by employers because they are uncertain what contracted employees will actually do with their time (Braverman, 1974). For example, ideological forms of control in the workplace are used to make employees actually want to align their goals and actions with those of their employers (Burawoy, 1979). This assumption has led to a rich tradition of research that examines how dominant groups seek to reduce indeterminacy and narrow the range of possible activities that actors might undertake (O'Doherty & Willmott, 2001).

To generate a new research trajectory, it might be possible to problematize this assumption. Power may actually be used to create and promote indeterminacy. Research has shown how some organizations have employed "neo-normative" controls in which difference, diversity and non-standardization are central in the production process (Fleming, 2014; Fleming & Sturdy, 2009). Managers do not determine the labor process but actively encouraged open indeterminacy regarding when, where, and how tasks were performed. Ressler and Thompson (2011) call this a "results only" management philosophy because it focuses only on outputs, leaving the responsibility for inputs to the employee. Such indeterminacy actually enhances productivity rather than undermine it. Further investigation into this type of power might open

up new vistas about how we understand control and influence in environments that appear to be liberating and empowering (also see Courpasson, 2006).

Contentions

In addition to these crosscutting agreements, there are also a number of striking contentions that define this research area. Indeed, Lukes (1974) suggestion that power is an "essentially contested concept" still holds true. The very nature of the subject matter leads to very different assumptions about how power functions. This perhaps makes it is difficult, if not impossible, to settle disagreements through the collection of additional evidence or by creating some kind of meta-theoretical framework.

There are four particular points of contention that we would like to examine in more depth. These are disagreements about (1) how power functions (whether it operates in an episodic or systemic fashion), (2) who exercises power in organizations (whether it is largely managerial or whether a range of stakeholders have power), (3) what the effects of organizational power are (whether they are repressive or productive), (4) and how power might be studied (whether it should be examined directly or indirectly).

The first contention concerns exactly how power functions. For some researchers, power is enacted through definable acts. These might include issuing orders, directing funds, or engaging in subtle backroom dealings. They are clearly acts that one can identify clearly. For others, power is seen as a property of the systemic environment itself. To understand power, therefore, it is not sufficient to examine how it operates through specific and definable acts. Instead, power can only be studied by focusing on social systems.

These two approaches are based upon different sets of assumptions. Those focusing on more episodical approaches to power look for observable actions. A more systematic approach examines the broader social structure as influence is mobilized. In this article, we have tried to deal with this problem by highlighting how episodic and systemic dynamics can be considered as two dimensions of the broader construct of power (see also Lawrence et al., 2012). If we are correct, it then becomes an empirical question as to why one dimension might dominate and others not. For example, are there particular kinds of work or organizations that are more likely to use systemic power and others that make episodic forms of domination more probable?

The second tension concerns the problem of who mobilizes power. For obvious reasons many researchers focus on managers as the major merchants of power in organizations. Of particular interest is high-level staff such as CEOs (Hambrick, 2007). Another group of studies has approached power as something more dispersed, mobilized by a wide range of stakeholders (Zald, 1970). This might include workers, communities, members of the supply chain, social movements, and so forth. These two different analytical focuses

often lead to very different political maps emerge regarding organizational life. For the first political map, all roads lead to central managers such as CEOs. The second map presents a far more diffuse and complicated image of how organizations operate.

Although the kind of map of power that researchers use may be quite different depending on their perspective, we think that there are some interesting empirical questions that might be suggested by the divergence. In particular, we could ask how different sets of actors are empowered or disempowered overtime. Are there particular situations that allow managerial actors to gain more power than others? This contingent and longitudinal approach may allow researchers to explore whether we have witnessed the increased empowerment of managerial actors in organizations or whether other actors (such as financiers, social movements, governments, and highly skilled employees) have gained more power overtime.

Furthermore, we might inquire about how these patterns of empowerment and disempowerment are distributed in organizations. Why do particular actors such as managers become increasingly empowered within an organization while other actors find their powers fading away? And what are the potentially effects of these differential distributions of power? Does the empowerment of a certain group of actors—such as shareholders—lead to distinctive outcomes in relation to the redistribution of resources or changing identities?

A third major contention concerns the precise outcomes of power (McCabe, 2000). Some claim that power is largely repressive in nature and tends to constrain activities in an organization (Braverman, 1974). For others, power is considered to be largely productive (Townley, 1993). It is a process that constructs subject positions as well as processes and agendas. Both perspectives lead to very different analytical concerns. Researchers building on a repressive approach to power identify how behavior is restricted and contained. Those who are interested in productive approaches focus on how power constructs various aspects of organizational reality related to truth claims and subject positions. Power enables action.

At first glance these assumptions seem diametrically opposed. However, we think it may prove fruitful to avoid treating these two approaches as simply an analytical choice, but an opportunity for further exploration. For example, it might be possible to blend these two concepts to create novel areas of research related to "productive repression". This would entail identifying forms of repression that actually create selves, objects, and empowerment. Highly repressive forms of power that prohibit individuals from doing certain things can actually function to create certain enabling positions. It also might be possible to explore modes of power that take the form of "repressive production". This would direct us to activities that underscore the production and reproduction of repressive regimes.

The final major contention that characterizes the literature concerns the problem of how we empirically measure power (Clegg, 1989). For some, power can be measured and mapped directly by observing what actors concretely do (Kuhn, 2008). For others, power cannot be observed directly. It needs to be identified through outcomes such as perceptions of being powerful (Gioia & Sim, 1983). Each methodological assumption can lead researchers to different research approaches. Those who assume that power can be measured directly deploy indicators, metrics, and direct observation. The second perspective uses broader types of empirical observation and makes inferences from a wide range of outcomes that may not first appear to be related to organizational power and politics.

While these two perspectives have prompted the use of different methodological tools, it may be possible to generate some methodological innovations by approaching the question in a less didactic fashion. For example, researchers may blend these methodologies to inquire why some aspects of power are more or less easily observable. Are there types of power more amenable to observational or quantitative methods? And might inference-based research inspire new empirical questions about the social conditions that allow for more directly quantifiable activities to be present in an organization? Finally, it is important to inquire about the processes through which otherwise observable enactments of power come to be made unobservable. And conversely, how and why do previously hidden and unobservable aspects of power suddenly become observable.

Emerging Research Concerns

We suggest that there are a number of exciting concerns emerging from organizational power research that may prompt future research activities. We are mindful that it is often novel empirical phenomena that provide the grist for the mill for the development of novel theory (Corley & Gioia, 2011). This is particularly true when existing theories do not adequately explain new phenomena. To identify these new issues, we have sought to highlight topics of broader public contention that have a limited but growing body of research associated with them. These are (1) elites, (2) collective action, (3) how corporations seek to shape society, and (4) the role of the state in influencing organizational power relations.

Before examining these themes, we should note that each area is not strictly novel. Some may even observe that these topics have a somewhat "retro" tone about them. However, we argue that the focus on largely fluid and fragmented power relationships found in much organizational research over the last two decades has largely obscured these more traditional and deeply institutionalized modes of power. We now know much about the way power operates in fleeting situations where actors often have a significant degree of autonomy.

However, our knowledge of how power functions through stronger and more difficult to manipulate apparatuses such as the state has not kept pace with emergent social trends. These institutionalized modes of power have not disappeared with the advent of "postindustrial society". Indeed, it might be argued that these constellations of power have actually become even more oppressive in recent years.

The first emergent theme that is noteworthy concerns elites. This involves the study of groups of very powerful people who often transcend the boundaries of individual organizations. The study of elites was a foundational concern in many studies of power (Mills, 1956; Zeitlin, 1974). However, this topic has largely been abandoned in favor of identifying more fluid and democratic power relations under the influence of Dahl (1957) and his followers. Only recently have we seen the theme of elites returning in organizational research (Zald & Lounsbury, 2010). The increasing dissolution of corporate hierarchies and the rising importance of small groups that wield massive economic power make the study of elites increasingly important today.

Future research might inquire about why elite networks have gained increased control over corporations (Mizruchi & Yoo, 2002), and how these groups are becoming increasingly transnational in scope (Kerr & Robinson, 2012). We think a particularly interesting question is precisely how elite networks are spreading their control across different types of organizations and whether there is some kind of circulation of elites among NGOs, governments and the corporation. Moreover, what types of elite are important in this regard? We suggest attention ought to be focused on iconic elite organizations like top strategy consultancies, think tanks and investment banks that actively seek to control the broader polity to further their interests.

The second emerging theme in the literature concerns the role of collective action. This research asks how people come together to exercise power and in some cases change its traditional distribution. Once again, there is a long tradition of research on collective action that has many overlaps with organization theory (Davis et al., 2005). But these investigations have tended to focus on the role of collective action *against* organizations. We feel this theme could be further explored in relation to power within organizations, over organizations and through organizations.

Examining collective action "in" organizations, for example, would enable researchers to understand how power is mobilized by various groups who come together to form intra-organizational movements. This would highlight issues such gender and racial discrimination, corporate social responsibility and new management ideas that are actively championed within organizations through the formation of social movements. A focus on collective action might also help us to appreciate the way groups seek to gain power "through" organizations. For example, such research would further investigate how these collective agents establish their power through founding specialist bodies that

represent their interests. It might also be possible to consider how collective action is used by various coalitions to gain power "over" organizations. For example, it may be possible to trace how managerial groups, professions, and other types of cohorts have sort to establish their influence over organizations—or indeed whole sets of organizations.

The third theme that we find very promising for future research involves exploring the increasing power of certain organizational forms, especially the private corporation. Recent investigations have pointed to how corporations have becoming very powerful actors that inordinately shape societal processes beyond their formal remit (Barley, 2010). Why and how is it that large institutions, and in particular corporations, have been able to establish and extend their own power within society? This question opens up some fascinating issues about the way corporations have politically maneuvered to capture broader socio-economic sectors to serve their interests. Future research might also explore this topic in relation to education, healthcare, religion, and family relationships. And how do these corporate institutions interact with another growing power base related to financialization—especially hedge funds and private equity firms?

The final emerging theme is the role of deeply institutionalized forms of power in shaping the distribution and dynamics of power in organizations. Typically we have assumed that existing institutionalized forms of power such as the state and the family have been in decline in comparison to the modern organization. However, we propose that these power arrangements have actually remained and in some cases increased. This is certainly the case with the state. In recent years, there has been an assumption that state power has been relaxed in liberal societies. However, recent revelations about the extent of state spying and surveillance suggest this is not so. The state seems to frequently operate hand-in-hand with organizations to enforce broader power relations. Often business corporations or indeed other kinds of organizations find themselves servants of state power. This is particularly obvious in non-liberal countries such as China and Russia. Much future research can be done in this area to examine the power of the state and how it operates in tandem with or against business corporations in particular.

Overlooked Issues

Based upon our review of the management and organization studies literature regarding power, we identified a number of themes that appear to have been omitted and overlooked. These neglected issues provide significant opportunities for future theory building to help us understand emerging modes of power and also develop existing conceptualizations. Although there is a wide range of issues that could potentially be singled out for attention, we feel four topics are surprisingly absent in current research.

The first concerns the almost entirely unreported connection between organizational power and violence. We suggest that in some circumstances, violence or the threat of violence may be deeply connected with current organizational power relationships. For example, there is clearly "rogue" instances violence in the workplace—which include everything from unsanctioned bullying to accidents to random workplace murders. How ought we understand these phenomena in relation to current theories of power? Additionally, many forms of organizational power are underscored by the threat or expectation of such violence. Acts of "random violence" are used to justify and drive extensive forms of official control such as surveillance systems. In this sense, studying how this "threat" is used by organizations might be instructive insofar as it would demonstrate how violence is often met with the continuation and increased intensity of organizational sanctioned power relations.

The study of organizational violence might be informative in other ways. For example, the selective use of violence or its threat is often an important way in which power functions under normal circumstances. The power of the state often rests—at least in last resort—on their legitimate recourse to physical force (Giddens, 1985). Although the state is a special case, violence may play a role in many organizations settings, including the military most obviously. Moreover, institutionalized violence may operate through collective bonds outside of official power relations. Organizations such as the military, factories, sports clubs, and boarding schools use "hazing" and beatings to initiate newcomers and create feelings of fraternity and honor. While clearly physical, such violence also plays an important symbolic role too (Bourdieu, 1991).

The second unexplored topic is the persistent presence of traditional patterns of authority in shaping organizational power relations. Much of the existing literature begins with the Weberian assumption that modern authority and (sometimes charismatic authority) is the key to understanding power relations in contemporary organizations. However, traditional forms of authority such as family relations and religion are often ignored as an ongoing regulative force. Thus, we miss the importance of family businesses or religious organizations. Moreover, there are many cases in which these traditional forms of authority subtly interweave with formal organizational power relations. For example, a number of large organizations still reply upon religious denomination in recruitment decisions. Similarly, kinship or kinship-like groups are often vital in shaping the distribution of power within or even between organizations (Jackall, 1988). Further research needs to be conducted to clarify how these more established forms of authority interlink, overlap and in some cases contrast with modern forms of authority.

The third area of neglect concerns the way institutional theory—and especially the very popular area of "institutional logics"—appears to have downplayed the role of power in organizations. It is surprising that the

founding insights of Friedland and Alford (1991)—which are deeply political and attuned to power relationships stemming from class and corporate domination—have significantly receded in much of the subsequent research concerning institutional logics. Following Thornton and Ocasio (1999), Lounsbury (2007), Greenwood, Magán, Li, and Lorente (2010) and Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) we suggest that this area of inquiry would massively benefit by placing power at the heart of the analysis once again. This is especially so in relation to the cultural contingency of power relations within institution-building settings.

The fourth and final neglected issue that the management and organization science may benefit from concerns the role of non-functional power relations. Much of the literature that we have reviewed tends to assume that power has some practical function. Power is usually studied when it seeks to achieve a definable objective (Ocasio, 2002). However, power relations may frequently be quite dysfunction insofar as they do not do what they are supposed to (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012). The hording of resources may fail to shore-up the power of the hoarder. Schemes of ideological control may not lead employees to change their belief systems. Attempts to manipulate employee's subjectivity may create alienation rather than increased commitment.

Indeed, we were surprised by the dearth of research concerning the way power may be exercised not to achieve any given goal but simply for its own sake. Many workers have reported examples where the exercise of power seems surplus or redundant to important functional requirements (Fleming & Spicer, 2007). In these instances, power may be more about gratuitous symbolic displays than seeking to achieve functional outcomes. Here, power ensures that actors actually *do not* get things done. This presents an interesting research trajectory whereby we study non-functional power relations that are in some ways surplus to requirements. This would entail a careful analysis of what Marcuse called "surplus oppression" (1955). We think that organizations continue to be hot-beds of this "surplus oppression" which ranges from overly restrictive systems to petty officialdom and the kind of repressive security measures which seem have become a common-place feature of organizational life.

Conclusion

Power is inescapable in organizations. It is literally everywhere. As the management and organization science literature reviewed in this paper attests, power is such a fundamental part of organizational life that without it they would be unable to function. However, except in the case of direct force and violence, power is not something that is easily identifiable (as we might do a table or the moon). Especially in the case of systemic power relations, its presence and effects must often be inferred from the social processes and forms we

study in and around organizations. Perhaps, if this ubiquitous and frequently "immaterial" nature of power that has given rise to such a varied and rich research domain. Our paper has sought to map these different conceptual approaches with the aforementioned framework in order to clarify how the topic has been approached and how it might still yield future surprises for management researchers.

While it is widely recognized that power is a central part of organizations, there is no doubt that it still has rather negative connotations, something that is perhaps derived from popular perceptions about its nature and effects of power. This might explain the rather "functionalist" bias that still characterizes management studies more broadly. The rationale goes like this: if we are able to identify the functionally necessary elements of power, then we may be able to curb its more irrational outcomes with better management models. Based upon our review, however, this assumption misses the way power is linked to politics, in which different interests and goals are central to its enactment. What is deemed functional to top management, for example, might be considered "irrational" to low-level workers (and vice versa). Additionally, as we noted in the review and the discussion, power might actually be useful for serving socially progressive ends, as the social movements literature attests. It not only represses and controls, but also produces behavior both desirable and undesirable, depending on the political lens through which one views it.

As with any analytical concept, the swiftly changing world of organizational life requires theories of power that are up-to-date and current with the emerging trends shaping business and society today. We predict that the shifting nature of economic life currently defining large swathes of society will lead researchers to focus not so much on organizations per se but *financialization*. The most powerful actors in economy and society emerging presently are complex and difficult to identify hedge-fund institutions (sometimes call "shadow banking") of which organizational researchers are only now turning their attention to. The increasing concentration of financial wealth in these complicated networks will provide new challenges for students of power, especially as they outstrip other institutions in shaping the future to come.

This brings us to our final observation. At the present juncture, we suggest, power is now an extremely pertinent topic of discussion given the massive amount of popular debate currently unfolding regarding the legitimacy of private corporations, state surveillance, and "shareholder capitalism" in the U.S.A., Europe, and elsewhere. The recent "Occupy Movement", for example, has raised serious legitimacy concerns about many of the organizations we study in management science. We hope that this paper offers a useful framework for researchers who have been prompted by these wider political events to revisit the concept of organizational power. As we have noted, although power has been researched extensively in management studies, there is still much to do.

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